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Bounding messages for free in security protocols
Myrto Arapinis and Marie Duflot
LACL - University Paris 12, France
myrto.arapinis@wanadoo.fr, duflot@univ-paris12.fr
Abstract. The verification of security protocols has been proven to be unde-
cidable in general. Different approaches use simplifying hypotheses in order to
obtain decidability for interesting subclasses. Amongst the most common is type
abstraction, i.e. considering only well-typed runs, therefore bounding message
length. In this paper we show how to get message boundedness “for free” under a
reasonable (syntactic) assumption on protocols, which we call well-formedness.
This enables us to improve existing decidability results.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are short programs that describe communication between two or
more parties in order to achieve security goals such as data confidentiality, identification
of a correspondent,... The protocols are executed in a hostile environment, such as the
Internet, and aim at preventing a malicious agent from tampering with the messages,
for instance, using encryption. However, encrypting messages is not sufficient to ensure
security properties. History has shown that these protocols are extremely error-prone
and careful, formal verification is needed.
Despite the apparent simplicity of such protocols, their verification is a difficult prob-
lem and has been proven undecidable in general [DLMS99,CC01]. Different attempts
[DLMS99,Low99,RT01,CC03,RS03a,RS03b,BP05] have successfully exhibited decid-
able subclasses, and tools for proving security have been designed even though termina-
tion is not always guaranteed [Mea96,CJM00,Bla01,CMR01,SBP01]. In the literature,
only very few results consider an unbounded number of sessions and even less allow un-
bounded creation of new nonces (constants generated to ensure freshness of messages).
Most papers bound the number of nonces or even the number of sessions in order to
obtain decidability (see the recapitulative table in [CDL06]).
In order to obtain decidability, many existing results [Low99,RS03a,DLMS99,CKR+03]
bound the message length in adopting a typing abstraction. An assumption according to
which one can always tell the type of a given message. While this appears as an unre-
alistic assumption in the general case, this paper presents a simple way of justifying it.
This question has been addressed in [LYH04,HLS03] amongst others, and solved with
tagging schemes.
In this paper, we show that when a protocol satisfies a reasonable, syntactic condition of
“well-formedness”, then the typing abstraction is a correct one. Furthermore, the con-
sidered typing system here is much more fine-grained than the one in [LYH04,HLS03],
thus refining existing results. Indeed, we prove that a well-formed protocol admits an
attack if and only if it admits a “well-typed” attack with respect to a stronger notion of
typing (see section 3.1).
Our notion of well-formed protocols characterizes protocols in which a term cannot be
mistaken for another, unless they are of the same type. This notion is often satisfied in
protocols found in the literature [CJ97] and, even when the protocol is not well-formed,
a light tagging like the one proposed in [BP05] permits to comply with the property
and thus use our result. Note that, the syntactic restriction considered here significantly
simplifies the ones in [LYH04,HLS03].
Fianlly, to the best of our knowledge, only very few papers [Low99,RS03a,RS03b] give
decidability results with an unbounded number of sessions and nonces. In the last part,
we show that hypotheses made in [RS03a,Low99] can be slightly modified in order to
meet the typing assumption, thus allowing us to refine the result of [RS03b] since the
tagging scheme we propose is strictly weaker that the one used in their paper.
2 Modelling security protocols
In this section we define the trace based model used throughout the paper to define and
reason about cryptographic protocols.
2.1 The syntax
Terms Data transmitted in the protocol are modelled as terms built by using the fol-
lowing components:
A set P = {P1, . . . , Pk} of principal names standing for the different participants of
the protocol. During one protocol execution, each principal Pi can generate a set Ki =
{Ki1, . . . ,K
i
li
} of short term keys or session keys, as well as a setNi = {N i1, . . . , N imi}
of fresh values called nonces. The set of session-keys (resp. nonces) generated by all
principals is denoted K (resp. N ). Finally the participants can use a finite set C =
{c1, . . . , cn} of constants.
Every principal Pi has its own set Xi = {X i1, . . . , X ipi} of variables. Variables are used
to model the fact that a principal may receive data which it does not know. The set of
variables is then X =
⋃k
i=1 Xi.
The set of terms is defined inductively using the above defined components as follows:
T ::= P | pbk(P) | pvk(P) | shk(P ,P) | K | N | C
| X | 〈T , T 〉 | {T }T | sigT (T )
where pbk(P ), pvk(P ) and shk(P, P ′) are respectively the public key, private key of a
principalP and shared key between principals P and P ′, and 〈t1, t2〉, {t1}t2 , sigt1(t2)
represent pairing, encryption and signature.
In what follows, we denote the set of variables of a term t by V(t), the set of subterms of
t by St(t), and the set of encrypted sub-terms of t byESt(t) = {f(t1, t2) ∈ St(t) | f ∈
{{ } , sig ( )}}.
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Actions In our formalism, we split the rules commonly used to describe protocols [CJ97]
into send and receive actions, in order to capture precisely what one principal sends
and what the receiver expects. We thus have a set of actions D = S ∪ R where
S = {Pi!Pj : t | Pi, Pj ∈ P , Pi 6= Pj , t ∈ T } is the set of send actions and
R = {Pi?Pj : t | Pi, Pj ∈ P , Pi 6= Pj , t ∈ T } is the set of receive actions.
The term of an action is defined by term(Pi!Pj : t) = term(Pi?Pj : t) = t, and
for every sequence of actions D = d1 . . . dn, terms(D) =
⋃n
i=1(term(di)). Simi-
larly the set of variables of D is V(D) = V(terms(D)), the set of sub-terms of D is
St(D) = ∪t∈terms(D)St(t), and the set of encrypted sub-terms of D is ESt(D) =
∪t∈terms(D)ESt(t).
Protocols
Definition 1. A protocol Π = s1r1 . . . slrl is a sequence of send-receive actions such
that, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l
1. si ∈ S and ri ∈ R
2. if si = P !P ′ : t, then ri = P ′?P : t′
3. if X ∈ V(term(si)), then ∃j, 1 ≤ j < i such that X ∈ V(term(rj))
4. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l there exists a substitution δi 6= ⊥, with
{
δ1 = mgu(term(s1), term(r1)), and
δk = mgu(δk−1(. . . δ1(sk)), δk−1(. . . δ1(rk))), ∀1 ≤ k ≤ l.
The composition δ = δl ◦ · · · ◦ δ1 is the honest substitution for all the variables
occurring in the protocol specification.
The first two points ensure that each send action is followed immediately by a receive
between the same two principals. Point 3 says that variables are only introduced when
receiving a term. Point 4 claims that matching send and receive events must be unifiable,
and compatible with the unification made on the previous actions.
A role of the protocol is the restriction of Π to the actions (send and receive) of one
principal, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. The Needham-Schroeder protocol
ΠNS = P1 ! P2 : {P1, N11 }pbk(P2)
P2 ? P1 : {P1, X21}pbk(P2)
P2 ! P1 : {X21 , N21 }pbk(P1)
P1 ? P2 : {N11 , X11}pbk(P1)
P1 ! P2 : {X11}pbk(P2)
P2 ? P1 : {N21}pbk(P2)
The protocol has two principals, hence two roles described here.
ΠNS1 = P1 ! P2 : {P1, N11 }pbk(P2)
P1 ? P2 : {N11 , X11}pbk(P1)
P1 ! P2 : {X11}pbk(P2)
ΠNS2 = P2 ? P1 : {P1, X21}pbk(P2)
P2 ! P1 : {X21 , N21 }pbk(P1)
P2 ? P1 : {N21}pbk(P2)
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2.2 The semantics
After having described the roles of a protocol, i.e. the way things should happen in a
honest execution of the protocol, we will now describe how things really happen. In
particular, we have to take into account the fact that a protocol can be executed several
times, or by different agents, and that in each case the nonces and keys should be dif-
ferent, in order to ensure freshness.
We use the notion of session as a partial instantiation of one of the roles of the protocol.
Since we do not assume the number of sessions to be bounded, we consider an infinite
set Σ = {σn | n ∈ N} of session ids. In the same vein, we consider an infinite set
A = {an | n ∈ N} ∪ {ǫ} of agents that will play the roles of the protocol, with the
special agent ǫ standing for the intruder.
The real values of nonces, session-keys and variables are instanciated with the session
Id σ as well as the name of each participant taking part in this session. This yields three
infinite sets:
K = {Kij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) | K
i
j ∈ K, σ ∈ Σ, (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ A
k} of session-keys,
N = {N ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) | N
i
j ∈ N , σ ∈ Σ, (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ A
k} of nonces and
X = {X ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) |X
i
j ∈ X , σ ∈ Σ, (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ A
k} of variables.
We do not need to consider the intruder as a normal agent that generates keys and
nonces during a session. It is provided at the beginning with a set of nonces and session
keys, one for each key/nonce that can be generated during the normal execution of the
protocol. These sets are denoted
Nǫ = {nij | i, j s.t. N
i
j ∈ N} and Kǫ = {kij | i, j s.t. Kij ∈ K}.
Using the above defined sets and the notions of long term keys, we can inductively
define the set of (instanciated) terms.
T ::= A | pbk(A) | pvk(A) | shk(A,A) | K | Kǫ | N |Nǫ
| C | X | 〈T,T〉 | {T}T | sigT(T)
The set M of actual messages exchanged on the network is the set of ground terms (i.e.
without variables) and can be recursively defined with a grammar similar to the previ-
ous one. Based on this definition of instanciated terms, we define the set D = S ∪ R
of possible instantiations of send and reveive actions.
In order to specify the correspondence between terms of T from the description of the
protocol and instanciated terms of T, we define for every (σ, b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Σ × Ak
the function ||.||(σ,b1,...,bk)) : T → T. This function associates to a principal Pj the
agent bj , to each nonce N ij (resp. session-key, variable) the corresponding instanciated
object N ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) and is defined inductively on encrypted subterms, pairs and
more generally on terms. It can also be extended to actions by:
||Pj !Pl : t||(σ,b1,...,bk) = ||Pj ||(σ,b1,...,bk)!||Pl||(σ,b1,...,bk) : ||t||(σ,b1,...,bk) and a similar
definition for receive actions.
A substitution is a map θ : X ⇒ T. θ(t) or tθ will denote indifferently the applica-
tion of substitution θ to term t. A unifier of two terms t and t′ is a substitution θ such
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that θ(t) = θ(t′). The most general unifier of two terms t, t′, denoted mgu(t, t′), is a
unifier θ of t and t′ such that for all unifer ψ of t and t′ there exists a substitution φ
such that ψ = φ ◦ θ. We will denote the fact that two terms t and t′ are not unifiable by
mgu(t, t′) = ⊥.
The formal execution model is a state transition system. A global state of the system is
given by (SId, q, I) where SId is a set of sessions, q is a function that describes the
local state of each session in SId and I ⊆ M represents the intruder’s knowledge.
More precisely, ∀σ ∈ SId, q(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, θ, p) is the local state of session σ:
– i is the index of the role that is executed in this session,
– (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Ak are the identities of the parties that are involved in the session,
– θ is a partial instantiation of variables occuring in ||Πi||(σ,b1,...,bk),
– p is the control point of the program.
Given a protocol Π , the initial state of Π is (SId0, q0, I0), with SId0 = ∅ (and
thus the definition of q0 is useless) and I0 = A ∪ C ∪ Kǫ ∪ Nǫ ∪ {pbk(a) | a ∈
A} ∪ {shk(a, ǫ), shk(ǫ, a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {pvk(ǫ)} (the intruder knows the agent names,
constants, his own session-keys and nonces, every agent’s public key as well as his own
private key and the keys he shares with other agents).
LetQ = (SId, q, I) be a global state forΠ . Three types of transitionsQ e−→ update(Q, e)
may be allowed:
1. Initiate a new session for the ith role (e = new(σ, i, b1, . . . , bk)):
– Event e is enabled at state Q whenever the session σ does not belong to SId,
the agent bi is not the intruder and any two agents taking part in this new session
are distinct.
– The effect of firing this transition is update(Q, e) = (SId ∪ {σ}, q′, I) with{
q′(σ′) = q(σ′), ∀σ′ ∈ SId
q′(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, ∅, 1).
2. Execute next send-action of an existing session σ ∈ SId (e = send(σ, p)):
– Event e is enabled at state Q whenever the control point of session σ is p and
the next action to perform in σ is a send action.
– The effect of firing this transition is update(Q, e) = (SId, q′, I ∪ {m}) with
m = θ(||t||(σ,b1,...,bk)) and{
q′(σ′) = q(σ′), ∀σ′ ∈ SId, σ′ 6= σ
(q′(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, θ, p+ 1)).
3. Execute next receive-action of an existing session σ ∈ SId (e = receive(σ, p,m)):
– Event e is enabled at state Q whenever the control point of session σ is p and
the next action to perform in σ is a receive action.
• m ∈ M is a message that can be computed by the intruder from I ,
• q(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, θ, p) (the control point of σ is p),
• Πi(p) = Pi?j : t (the next action is a receive),
• ψ 6= ⊥, where ψ = mgu(m, θ(||t||(σ,b1,...,bk))) (m and the expected mes-
sage are unifiable).
– The effect of firing this transition is update(Q, e) = (SId, q′, I) with{
q′(σ′) = q(σ′), ∀σ′ ∈ SId, σ′ 6= σ
q′(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, θ ∪ ψ, p+ 1).
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The adversary intercepts messages between honest participants and computes new mes-
sages using the deduction rule ⊢ defined in Fig.1. Intuitively M ⊢ m means that the
adversary is able to compute the message m from the set of messages M . The notation
m−1 stands for pbk(a) if m is of the type pvk(a), pvk(a) if m is of the type pbk(a),
and m−1 = m otherwise.
M ⊢ m
m ∈M
M ⊢ m1 M ⊢ m2
M ⊢ 〈m1,m2〉
M ⊢ 〈m1,m2〉
M ⊢ mi
1 ≤ i ≤ 2
M ⊢ m1 M ⊢ m2
M ⊢ {m1}m2
M ⊢ {m1}m2 M ⊢ m
−1
2
M ⊢ m1
M ⊢ m1 M ⊢ m2
M ⊢ sigm1(m2)
M ⊢ sigm1(m2) M ⊢ m
−1
1
M ⊢ m2
Fig. 1. Deduction rules
Example 2. In order to better understand the effect of firing transition, in Fig.4 we have
detailed a valid trace of length 7 for ΠNS . Due to space restrictions, the trace is given
in appendix.
2.3 The secrecy problem
Let Π be an arbitrary k-party protocol. We say that Π guarantees the secrecy of nonce
N ij ∈ N (resp. session-key Kij ∈ K) if, in all possible executions, each honest instan-
tiation of N ij (resp. Kij) remains unknown to the adversary.
More formally, we say that Π preserves secrecy of nonce N ij ∈ N (of session key
resp Kij ∈ K) if for every valid trace (SId0, s0, I0) →∗ (SIdn, sn, In) of the
protocol and for every (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ (A \ {ǫ})k (i.e. k honest agents), we have
In 6⊢ N ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) (resp. In 6⊢ Kij(σ, b1, . . . , bk)) for some σ ∈ SIdn.
We say that Π admits an attack on nonce N ij ∈ N (resp. session-key Kij ∈ K) if there
exists (SIdn, sn, In) s.t. (SId0, s0, I0) →∗ (SIdn, sn, In) and b1, . . . , bk ∈ A \ ǫ,
and we have In ⊢ N ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk) (resp. In ⊢ N ij(σ, b1, . . . , bk)) for some σ ∈ SIdn
Example 3. An attack on ΠNS
The trace of ΠNS detailed in Fig.4 is an attack on the nonce N21 . Indeed, from I7 the
intruder can deduce N21 (σ2, a, b) which is encrypted with its own public key.
3 Well-formed protocols and well-typed attacks
In this section, we state the main result of the paper. We prove that for a well-formed
protocol (i.e. with non unifiable subterms), for verification of secrecy properties we
only need to consider well-typed runs of the protocol, i.e. for well-formed protocols the
typing abstraction, with respect to the following type system, is correct.
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3.1 Types
We introduce in this section a very strong typing on messages, that will allow us to re-
strict significantly the set of traces to consider in order to detect an attack. For example,
nonces may have different types, depending on the role that generated them and the
moment of the protocol when they were generated.
We first use a single type agent α for every principal name P ∈ P . In particular, the
intruder has the same type as any other agent.
To each session-key Kij in K (resp. nonce N ij in N , constant ci in C), we associate a
different type κij (resp. νij , γi). The notations κ, ν and γ denote respectively the set of
session-key types, nonce types and constant types.
We thus obtain inductively the following type set for terms:
τ ::= α | κ | ν | γ | pbk(α) | pvk(α) | shk(α, α) | 〈τ, τ〉 | {τ}τ | sigτ (τ)
The typing rules are given in Fig.2
P ∈ P
P : α
ci ∈ C
ci : γi
Kij ∈ K
Kij : κ
i
j
N ij ∈ N
N ij : ν
i
j
P ∈ P
pbk(P ) : pbk(α)
P ∈ P
pvk(P ) : pvk(α)
P, P ′ ∈ P
shk(P, P ′) : shk(α,α)
t1 : τ1 t2 : τ2
f(t1, t2) : f(τ1, τ2)
X ∈ X δ(X) : τ
X : τ
t : τ
||t||(σ,b1,...,bk) : τ
k
i
j ∈ Kǫ
k
i
j : κ
i
j
n
i
j ∈ Nǫ
n
i
j : ν
i
j
Fig. 2. Typing rules
Definition 2. A well-typed run is a valid trace (SId0, q0, I0) →∗ (SIdn, qn, In)
such that for every session id σ ∈ SIdn with qn(σ) = (i, b1, . . . , bk, θ, p), for every
variable X ∈ dom(θ), X : τ ⇒ θ(X) : τ .
This definition states that each variable used in the specification is always instanciated
(using substitution θ) by a message with the expected type.
Example 4. The run detailed in Fig.4 is well-typed. Indeed,
X11 (σ1, a, ǫ) : ν
2
1 and θ(X11 (σ1, a, ǫ)) = N21 (σ2, a, b) : ν21
X21 (σ2, a, b) : ν
1
1 and θ(X21 (σ2, a, b)) = N11 (σ1, a, ǫ) : ν11
The following definition constrains unifiability between subterms of different type.
Definition 3. A protocol Π (as defined in the previous section) is said to be well-
formed when the following condition holds:
∀t, t′ ∈ ESt(Π), if there exist (σ, b1, . . . , bk), (σ′, b′1, . . . , b′k) ∈ Σ ×Ak and a substi-
tution θ such that θ(||t||(σ,b1,...,bk)) = θ(||t′||(σ′,b′1,...,b′k)), then δ(t) = δ(t
′).
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As claimed in the introduction, this condition is often met in practice in the literature
(see [CJ97]) and even when the protocol isn’t well-formed, a light tagging scheme as
used in [BP05] in which a different label is introduced at every encryption step of the
specification, ensures well-formedness. We present such a tagging scheme in defini-
tion 7 in the context of the decidability results of [RS03a].
3.2 Considering only well-typed runs for well-formed protocols
We now state the main result of this paper. Due to a lack of space its proof is given in
appendix B. We will give here the main ideas of the proof.
Theorem 1. Let Π be a well-formed protocol. If Π admits an attack, then Π admits a
well-typed attack.
The proof is based on the fact that if a protocol admits an attack then it admits an at-
tack of bounded length n, which can thus be found. The proof of theorem 1 is done by
induction on a procedure searching for this attack. Indeed, we show that the considered
procedure from [CZ06] instantiates variables only with terms of the expected type. We
will first detail this procedure and then come back to explanations about well-typedness
of computed substitutions.
The secrecy problem for security protocols can be translated into a constraint satisfac-
tion problem [MS01,CZ06,RT01]. In [CZ06] it is shown that using some simplification
rules, solving general constraints can be reduced to solving simpler constaint systems
that are called solved.
Definition 4. [CZ06] A constraint system C is a finite set of expressions Ti  tt or
Ti  ui where Ti ⊆ T, Ti 6= ∅, tt is a special symbol that represents an always
deducible term, and ui ∈ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that:
– Ti ⊆ Ti+1, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
– if X ∈ V(Ti), then ∃j<i such that Tj = min{T | T  u ∈ C,X ∈ V(u)} (for the
inclusion relation) and Tj  Ti
⊥ denotes the unsatisfiable system. A constraint system is said to be solved if it is
different from ⊥ and each of its constraints are of the form T  tt or T  X , where
X ∈ X.
The left-hand side of the constraint T  u is T and u is its right-hand side. The left-hand
side lhs(C) of the constraint system C is the maximal left-hand side of its constraints,
and the right-hand side rhs(C) of C is the set of messages in the right-hand side of
its constraints. We consider the following sets over C defined as expected: V(C) =
V(lhs(C)) ∪ V(rhs(C)), terms(C) = lhs(C) ∪ rhs(C), St(C) = St(terms(C))
and ESt(C) = ESt(terms(C)).
The simplification rules we consider are defined in Fig.3. They have been proven cor-
rect, complete and terminating in polynomial time [CZ06]1.
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R1 C ∧ T  u  ∅ C ∧ T  tt if T ∪ {X | T ′  X ∈ C, T ′  T} ⊢ u
R2 C ∧ T  u  ψ Cψ ∧ Tψ  uψ if ψ = mgu(t, u), t ∈ ESt(T )
t 6= u, u not variable
R3 C ∧ T  u  ψ Cψ ∧ Tψ  uψ if ψ = mgu(t1, t2), t1, t2 ∈ ESt(T )
t1 6= t2
R4 C ∧ T  u  ∅ ⊥ if V(T, u) = ∅ and T 6⊢ u
Rf C ∧ T  f(u, v)  ∅ C ∧ T  u ∧ T  v for f ∈ {〈 , 〉, { } , sig ( )}
Fig. 3. Simplification rules
We now give a proof sketch of theorem 1.
The proof is done by induction, as said before, on the length n of a sequence of simpli-
fications leading to an attack:
C0  
Ri1
θ1
C1  
Ri2
θ2
· · · 
Rin
θn
Cn
where C0 is the initial constraint system corresponding to the interleaving of the con-
sidered attack, andCn is a solved constraint system. Such a Cn exists since the protocol
admits an attack with this interleaving, and the simplification rules are correct, complete
and terminating.
It is easy to see that rules R1, R4 and Rf preserve well-typedness since they do not
instantiate any variable.
For rules R2 and R3 we show, by means of some lemmas given in appendix A (again
due to a lack of space), that the selected substerms t and t′, such thatψj = mgu(t, t′) 1 ≤
j ≤ n when Rij ∈ {R2, R3}, are of the same type and that computing the mgu of two
terms of the same type results in a well-typed substitution. This allows us to conclude
that, when applying these rules, variables are instantiated only with terms of the ex-
pected type, and thus they preserve well-typedness.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous theorem and of
the fact that function application (pairing, encrypting and signing) is embedded in the
type of a term.
Corollary 1. Let Π be a well-formed protocol. If Π admits an attack, then Π admits
an attack with messages of bounded length.
We have thus proved in this section that the encryption abstraction is correct for well-
formed protocols. And that this holds for a much more fine-grained type notion than the
one considered in [LYH04,HLS03], where all nonces and session keys are of the same
type. This severely restricts the search space to consider for verification purposes. We
now define a tagging scheme that ensures well-formedness.
1 Actually, the rules presented in [CZ06] allow unification between pairs in rules R2 and R3.
But since then, the authors have let us know that we could just consider unification between
encrypted terms. Thus, the rules presented in Fig.3 slightly differ from, but are equivalent to,
the original rules in [CZ06].
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Definition 5. A tagged protocol is a protocol (as defined in the previous section) s. t.:
∀t ∈ ESt(Π), ∃c ∈ C and t1, t2 ∈ T s.t. t = {c, t1}t2 or t = sigt1(c, t2),
∀t, u ∈ ESt(Π) s.t. t = f(l, t1, t2) and u = g(l, u1, u2), then f = g and δ(t) = δ(u).
It immediately follows that such tagged protocols verify well-formedness. This tagging
scheme is extremely lighter than the ones in [LYH04,HLS03] where the whole type of
an encrypted subterm is used for tagging it. We have thus obtained a more refined type
abstraction with a very simple tagging scheme.
4 Application to decidability results
As claimed in the introduction, the type assumption is often necessary in order to obtain
decidability and in particular in the presence of an unbounded number of sessions and
nonces. Indeed, Lowe in [Low99] as well as Ramanujam and Suresh in [RS03a] prove
the decidability of a class of protocols but assume that messages are of bounded length.
In [RS03a], the authors prove decidability of the secrecy problem (for a stronger def-
inition of secrecy than the one given in section 2.3) in the framework of messages of
bounded length, for a class of protocols they call structured. Since structured protocols
do not admit blind copies, we can slightly strengthen their definition in order to ensure
well-formedness, and we claim that this does not restrict the class of protocols from
a semantic point of view. Indeed, any structured protocol in the sence of [RS03a] can
easiliy be transformed in a well-structured protocol in the sense of definition 6 (because
of the absence of blind copies) without changing its purported “meaning”. Hence we
can combine the decidability result in [RS03a] and theorem 1.
Definition 6. A protocolΠ = s1r1 . . . slrl is said to be well-structured if the following
conditions hold:
– Π doesn’t have blind copies, each variable is of atomic type,
– keys are atomic,
– encrypted subterms are textually distinct, an encrypted subterm t of a protocol in
the described class can be unified only with its matching send or receive t′.
The above definition constrains unifiability of different subterms (even of the same mes-
sage) whereas the one of [RS03a] only constrains unifiability of subterms of different
messages.
As already argued above, the additional restriction is not severe and acceptable as it
yields decidability for unbounded messages. Moreover, since two encrypted subterms
of the protocol t, t′ ∈ ESt(Π) are unifiable iff the one is the send or receive message
of the other, it is the case that δ(t) = δ(t′). Thus well-structured protocols as defined in
definition 6 are well-formed, which permits us to conclude to the decidability of well-
structured protocols in the frame of unbounded message length.
One way of ensuring well-structuredness may be by means of tags/labels.
Definition 7. A protocol Π = s1r1 . . . slrl is a tagged protocol if it satisfies the folow-
ing conditions:
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– no blind copies,
– keys are atomic,
– ∀t ∈ ESt(Π), ∃c ∈ C, ∃t1, t2 ∈ T such that t = {c, t1}t2 or t = sigt2(c, t1)
– ∀c, c′ ∈ C, ∀i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, if f(c, t1, t2) ∈ ESt(si) then ∀f(c′, u1, u2) ∈
ESt(sj), c 6= c′
– ∀c ∈ C, ∀i 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l, ∀p ∈ N∗, if term(si)|p = f(c, t1, t2) then ∀qN∗ s.t.
q 6= p ∧ si|q = f(c′, u1, u2), c 6= c′.
The third condition is similar to all definitions of tagged protocols [BP05,RS03b]. The
fourth condition stipulates that each tag is use at most in one send event; and the fifth,
that a tagged use in a send event is used in at moste one position. We have thus con-
straind to be used exactly once in the protocol. Thus any encrypted subterm is unifiable
with and only with its matching send or receive action. Therefore tagged protocols are
well-structured, and we can hence conclude to decidability of the secrecy problem for
tagged protocols. The secrecy problem, for the class of tagged protocols, is shown to
be decidable in [RS03b], but the considered tagging scheme is heavier. Indeed, in the
above definition a few bits are sufficient to tag messages, whereas in [RS03b] each en-
crypted subterm of the protocol is tagged with a pair (c,N) where c is a constant and
N is a different nonce making the tagging scheme heavier.
5 Conclusion
The result presented in this paper is a first step towards decidability. We have proven
that for a well known and wide class of protocols (that we call well-formed) the type
abstraction is correct. Therefore there is no need to check for badly typed attacks, and
this restricts the search space to consider in order to prove secrecy for a protocol. This
was achieved in a much more economic way than in [LYH04,HLS03]. Further, the type
abstraction is here significantly refined.
In addition, we have shown how this result can improve existing decidability results. We
also believe it could improve the efficiency of existing tools by restricting their search
space to well-typed executions.
Our next goal is to use our theorem to get decidability for (at least a large subclass of)
our well-formed protocols. The idea is that protocols at stake in existing undecidabil-
ity proofs lie outside our framework. They are either not executable (i.e. in an honest
execution, some action of the specification can never occur) or not well-formed (i.e.
they allow, for example, to replay a message generated in a session at step m in another
session at step n < m without the agents noticing it). We expect that the restriction to
well-formed and executable protocols will lead to a larger decidable subclass.
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A Some lemmas
As said before, the proof of the main theorem necessitates some lemmas that we give
here.
The first lemma stipulates that the most general unifier of two terms of the same type is
well-typed.
Lemma 1. Let t, u ∈ T and mgu(t, u) 6= ⊥ (i.e. t and u are unifiable), if t : τ and
u : τ (i.e. t and u are of the same type), then mgu(t, u) is well typed.
The proof of lemma 1 is done by induction on the algorithm that computes the most
general unifier, the one we have chosen here is the one in [MM82]. Before proceeding
with the proof, we need to recall some notions introduced in [MM82] as well as the
unification procedure.
The unification problem mgu(t, u) can be written as the equation t = u. We will need
to consider sets of equations {ti = ui|ti, ui ∈ T}1≤i≤k. A set of equations is said to be
in solved form iff the two following conditions hold:
1. the equations are Xi = ti, Xi ∈ X, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
2. every variable which is the left member of some equation occurs only there.
The following algorithm computes a solved set of equations equivalent to the one given
in argument. In [MM82] it is shown that the resulting solved set of equations is the most
general unifier of the initial one. Thus in order to compute mgu(t, u) for some terms t
and u, we apply this algorithm to the set of equations {t = u}.
Algorithm [MM82] Given a set of equations, repeatedly perform any of the following
transformations. If no transformation applies, stop with success.
(a) Select any equation of the form t = X , where t 6∈ X, and X ∈ X and rewrite it as
X = t.
(b) Select any equation of the form X = X , where X ∈ X, and erase it.
(c) Select any equation of the form s = v, where s, v 6∈ X. If the two function sym-
bols are different, stop with failure; otherwise (i.e. s = f(s1, . . . , sn) and v =
f(v1, . . . , vn)), replace this equation by the following ones: s1 = v1, . . . , sn = vn.
In particular if f is a constant (i.e. n = 0) then just erase the selected equation.
(d) Select any equation of the form X = t (i.e. the equation set E is of the form
E′ ∪ {X = t} for some equation set E′), where X ∈ X, t 6= X . If X occurs in t,
then stop with failure; otherwise, replace E with the set (E′[X ← t] ∪ {X = t})
We say that an equation t = t′ is well-typed whenever t and t′ are of the same type. A
set of equations is well-typed when all the equations in the set are well-typed.
We can now proceed with the proof of lemma 1.
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Proof (lemma 1). Let t, u ∈ T such that t : τ , u : τ , and θ = mgu(t, u). The substi-
tution θ can be computed following the above algorithm. The initial set of equations
is {t = u}, and since t and u are by hypothesis of the same type, then the initial set
of equations is well-typed. It is thus sufficient to prove that an iteration of the algo-
rithm preserves well-typedness, that is when an iteration of this algorithm is applied to
a well-typed set of equations E, then the resulting set E′ of equations is well-typed.
– If the applied rule is (a) then the resulting set is clearly well-typed since we only
replace a well-typed equation s = X by X = s.
– If the applied rule is (b) then we replace E well-typed by E′ ( E which is trivially
well-typed.
– If the applied rule is (c) and since θ 6= ⊥, then E is either of the form E′′ ∪
{f(t1, t2) = f(u1, u2)}, with f ∈ {〈 , 〉, { } , sig ( )} and t1, t2, u1, u2 ∈ T or
of the form E′′ ∪ {s = v}, with s, v ∈ T0 for some set of equations E′′. In the
first case the resulting set is E′ = E′′ ∪ {t1 = u1, t2 = u2}. From the typing
rules in Fig.2 and since f(t1, t2) and f(u1, u2) are of the same type f(τ1, τ2), then
{t1 = u1, t2 = u2} is well-typed as well as E′′ ∪ {t1 = u1, t2 = u2}. Thus, E′ is
well-typed. In the second case E′ = E′′ and it is thus immediate that E′ is well-
typed.
– If the applied rule is (d), then E is of the form E′′ ∪ {X = s} for some set of
equationsE′′ and some s ∈ T and X ∈ X, and since θ 6= ⊥, X does not occur in s.
The resulting equation set is E′′[X ← s]∪ {X = s}. Now, for every equation v =
w in E′′ since X and s are of the same type (X = s is well typed), then v[X ← s]
and v (resp. w[X ← s] and w) are of the same type , thus v[X ← s] = w[X ← s]
is well-typed, and finally E′ = E′′[X ← s] ∪ {X = s} is well-typed. ⊓⊔
Because lemma 4, needed for the proof of the main theorem, is rather technical and not
intuitive at all, we separate the steps of the proof by the means of the two following
lemmas, and that in order to make it more comfortable to the reader.
Lemma 2. For every pair of terms t, u ∈ T and every substitution θ, if u ∈ ESt(tθ),
then (u ∈ θ(ESt(t))) or (∃X ∈ V(t) s.t. u ∈ ESt(Xθ)).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of t:
– If t ∈ T0, then tθ = t and ESt(tθ) = ∅, thus u 6∈ ESt(tθ), and the implication
trivially holds.
– If t = X ∈ X, then tθ = Xθ and since u ∈ ESt(tθ), then u ∈ ESt(Xθ), and thus
the second part of the disjunction holds.
– If t = 〈t1, t2〉 for some t1, t2 ∈ T, then tθ = 〈t1θ, t2θ〉, and thus u ∈ ESt(t1θ) ∨
u ∈ ESt(t2θ). By induction we know that u ∈ θ(ESt(ti)) or (∃X ∈ V(ti) s.t. u ∈
ESt(θ(X))), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2. Finally, for i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, if u ∈ θ(ESt(ti)), since
ESt(ti) ⊆ ESt(t), then θ(ESt(ti)) ⊆ θ(ESt(t)) and thus u ∈ θ(ESt(t)); else
∃X ∈ V(ti) s.t. u ∈ ESt(θ(X)) and since V(ti) ⊆ V(t) then we trivially have
that ∃X ∈ V(t) s.t. u ∈ ESt(θ(X)).
– If t = f(t1, t2) with t1, t2 ∈ T and f ∈ {{ } , sig ( )}. We need to distinguish
two cases:
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1. u = tθ
By definition of ESt, we have that t ∈ ESt(t) and thus, tθ ∈ θ(ESt(t)), so
the first part of the disjunction holds.
2. u 6= tθ
As in the previous case with the pairing function u ∈ ESt(t1) ∨ u ∈ ESt(t2)
and thus we can conclude with the same argument as we did above. ⊓⊔
For the following lemma we introduce a bit of notation. Let E = {t1 = u1, . . . , tn =
un} be a set of equation, we define the set of terms of E and the set of encrypted
subterms of E as expected:
terms(E) =
⋃i=n
i=1{ti, ui} and ESt(E) = ESt(terms(E)).
Furthermore, we will denoteE →Rψ E′ an iteration of the algorithm computing the mgu
and presented above, where E′ is the resulting equation set when rule R ∈ {a, b, c, d}
is applied to an equation ti = ui of E for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ψ = ∅ if R ∈ {a, b, c}
else ψ = [ti ← ui].
Lemma 3. For every tuple of terms s, t, u ∈ T and X ∈ V({t, u}) s.t. mgu(t, u) =
ψ 6= ⊥, if s ∈ ESt(ψ(X)), then there exists s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) s.t. s = ψ(s′).
Proof. Let E0 = {t = u} →R1ψ1 E1 →R2ψ2 · · · →Rnψn En be a sequence of sets of
equations computed by the unifying algorithm. We show by induction on the length n
of the computation, that ∀s ∈ ESt(En), ∃s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) s.t. s = ψn ◦ · · · ◦ψ1(s′).
If n = 0, then it is immediate that the statement holds. Suppose now that for 0 ≤ n ≤ p
it is true, and let n = p+ 1, then we have a sequence of computations of the form:
E0 = {t = u} →
R1
ψ1
E1 →
R2
ψ2
· · · →
Rp
ψp
Ep →
Rp+1
ψp+1
Ep+1
– IfRp+1 ∈ {a, b, c}, then ψp+1 = ∅ andESt(Ep+1) ⊆ ESt(Ep), thus by induction
we have that ∀s ∈ ESt(Ep+1), ∃s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) s.t. s = ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′),
and since ψp+1 = ∅ we have that ψp+1 ◦ ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1 = ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1. Thus
s = ψp+1 ◦ ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′) for some s′ ∈ ESt({t, u})
– If Rp+1 = d, then the selected equation is of the form X = v for some X ∈ X and
some v ∈ T, Ep is of the form E ∪ {X = v} and Ep+1 = E[X ← v] ∪ {X = v}.
Let s ∈ ESt(Ep+1). If s ∈ ESt({X = v}), then s ∈ ESt(v) and since X = v ∈
Ep by induction we know that ∃s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) such that s = ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′)
and finally we know that if rule (d) is applied then X does not occur in v, thus
s = ψp+1 ◦ ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′).
Now we need to consider the case where s ∈ ESt(Eψp+1). That means that there
exists some w ∈ terms(Eψp+1) such that s ∈ ESt(w) and thus there exists some
w′ ∈ terms(E) ⊆ Ep such that w = w′ψp+1, i.e. s ∈ ESt(w′ψp+1) for some
w′ ∈ terms(Ep). From lemma 2 we know that s ∈ (ψp+1(ESt(w′))) ∨ (∃Y ∈
V(w′), s ∈ ESt(ψp+1(Y ))). In the first case we can conclude by induction that
∃s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) such that s = ψp+1 ◦ ψp ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′); and in the second it
is obvious that it is X that is in V(w′) such that s ∈ ESt(ψp+1(X)) = ESt(v)
since X is the only variable in dom(ψp+1). And as we showed before, there exists
s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) such that s = ψp+1 ◦ · · · ◦ ψ1(s′).
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We have finally proved that for any sequence of computations E0 = {t = u} →R1ψ1
E1 →
R2
ψ2
· · · →Rnψn En, we have that ∀s ∈ ESt(En), ∃s
′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) s.t. s =
ψn ◦ · · · ◦ ψn(s′) and in particular for En in solved form (i.e. En = mgu(t, u))). Now
it is easy to see that ψ = ψn ◦ . . . ψ1, thus we can conclude that if s ∈ ESt(ψ(X)),
then there exists s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) s.t. s = ψ(s′). ⊓⊔
This fourth lemma necessitates introducing some more notations. In what follows, we
will denote the following simplifications
C0  ψ1 C1  ψ2 · · · ψn Cn
by C0  nθ Cn, where θ = ψn ◦ · · · ◦ ψ2 ◦ ψ1.
Lemma 4. Let Π be a protocol, C0 a constraint system corresponding to some inter-
leaving of Π’s sessions and, C0  nθ Cn a sequence of simplifications according to the
rules in Fig.3. The following statement holds:
∀t ∈ ESt(Cn), ∃t
′ ∈ ESt(Π) s.t. t = θ(||t′||(σ,b1,...,bk))
for some (σ, b1, . . . , bk) in Σ ×Ak.
Proof. We do this by induction on the length n of the simplification sequence.
If n = 0, then by construction of C0 we have that for every term u that occurs in C0,
there exists a term u′ ofΠ such that u = ||u′||(σ,b1,...,bk) for some (σ, b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Σ×
Ak. Since t ∈ ESt(C0), then there exists some u ∈ terms(C0), and thus from what we
just said, ∃u′ ∈ terms(Π) and some (σ, b1, . . . , bk) such that t ∈ ESt(||u′||(σ,b1,...,bk))
and thus ∃t′ ∈ ESt(u′) ⊆ ESt(Π) such that t = ||t′||(σ,b1,...,bk).
We suppose that for 0 ≤ n ≤ p the hypothesis holds.
Now, if n = p + 1, then the reduction sequence is of the form C0  nθ Cp  
Ri
ψ Cp+1
for some substitution θ and some constraint system Cp.
– If i ∈ {1, 4, f}, ESt(Cp+1) ⊆ ESt(Cp), and we can conclude immediately using
the induction hypothesis.
– i = 2 ⇒ Cp = C ∧ T  u for some C, T and u, and ψ = mgu(t, u) for some
t ∈ ESt(T ).
Let s ∈ ESt(Cp+1). By ESt’s definition it is the case that there exists v ∈
terms(Cp+1) such that s ∈ ESt(v), and since Cp+1 = Cpψ, there exists w ∈
terms(Cp) such that v = wψ, and thus s ∈ ESt(wψ) for some w in Cp. From
lemma 2 we have that either s ∈ ψ(ESt(w)), or ∃X ∈ V(w) and s ∈ ESt(ψ(X)).
We consider these two cases separately:
1. If s ∈ ψ(ESt(w)) and since w ∈ terms(Cp), we have that s ∈ ψ(ESt(Cp)),
i.e. s = w′ψ for some w′ ∈ ESt(Cp). Now, by induction we know that
there exists w′′ ∈ ESt(Π) such that w′ = θ(||w′′||(σ,b1,...,bk)), and thus
s = ψ(θ(||w′′||(σ,b1,...,bk))).
2. If ∃X ∈ V(w) and s ∈ ESt(ψ(X)), from lemma 3 we know that there exists
s′ ∈ ESt({t, u}) ⊆ ESt(Cp) s.t. s = ψ(s′), and by induction there exists
s′′ ∈ ESt(Π) and some (σ, b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Σ×Ak s.t. s′ = θ(||s′′||(σ,b1,...,bk)),
and thus s = ψ ◦ θ(||s′′||(σ,b1,...,bk))
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– The case i = 3 is similar to the previous one, thus ommitted.
In every subcase, we can conclude that there exists t′ ∈ ESt(Π such that t = θ(||t′||(σ,b1,...,bk)).
⊓⊔
B Proof of the main result
Theorem 1. Let Π be a well-formed protocol. If Π admits an attack, then Π admits a
well-typed attack.
Proof. Let tr = (SId0, q0, I0) → . . . → (SIdn, qn, In) be an attack and C0 be
the constraint set corresponding to tr’s interleaving. Since the reduction procedure is
terminating, sound and complete and Π admits an attack with this interleaving, then C0
admits a solution, i.e. there exist C, θ,m such that, C0  mθ C and C is solved.
We will first show that θ is well-typed. We do this by induction on the length m of
C0  
m
θ C:
If m = 0, then θ = ∅, and thus θ is well-typed.
We suppose that 0 ≤ m ≤ p, C0  mθ C, θ is well-typed.
If m = p+ 1, then ∃C′, θ′ such that:
C0  
p
θ′ C
′
 
Ri
ψ C, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, f} and θ = ψ ◦ θ
′
and by induction we know that θ′ is well-typed.
– If i ∈ {1, f} then ψ = ∅, thus θ = θ′ and by induction we can conclude that θ is
well-typed.
– If i = 4 then C = ⊥ and this contradicts the fact that C is solved.
– If i = 2 then there existC′′, T, u such thatC′ = C′′∧T  u andC = C′′ψ∧Tψ 
uψ, with ψ = mgu(t, u), t ∈ ESt(T ), t 6= u and u not variable.
Since, θ′ is well-typed and dom(θ′) ∩ dom(ψ) = ∅, we only need to show that ψ
is well-typed.
Since u is not a variable and unifiable with an ancrypted subterm of T , u is also
an encrypted subterm (thus t, u ∈ ESt(C′)). And from lemma 4 we know that
∃t′, u′ ∈ ESt(Π) and ∃(σ, b1, . . . , bk), (σ′, b′1, . . . , b′k) ∈ Σ × Ak such that t =
θ′(||t′||(σ,b1,...,bk)) and u = θ′(||u′||(σ′,b′1,...,b′k)), and thus ψ ◦θ
′(||t′||(σ,b1,...,bk)) =
ψ ◦ θ′(||u′||(σ′,b′
1
,...,b′
k
)). Now by well-formed protocols’ definition we have that
δ(t′) = δ(u′) and thus t′ : τ ⇒ u′ : τ . Now since we know by induction that θ′ is
well-typed, we also have that t : τ and u : τ , and with lemma 1 we can conclude
that ψ is well-typed.
– The case i = 3 is similar to the previous one, thus ommitted.
In every subcase we can conclude that θ is well typed and C is solved.
To end the proof we now need to show that there exists a well-typed substitution of
variables remaining uninstantiated by θ, i.e. variables in right hand side of constraints
in C. We can note that if these variables remain uninstanciated in C, it means that there
exists an attack (well-typed) no matter the actual value taken by these variables. In order
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to keep the well-typedness of the attack we just need to instanciate them by an object of
the correct type. Since the intruder can create an object of each type, this instanciation
is possible.
For every X ∈ rhs(C) of type τ , we define ξ(X) = fake(τ) with fake defined recur-
sively as follows:
fake(α) = ǫ fake(γi) = ci
fake(κij) = k
i
j fake(ν
i
j) = n
i
j
fake(pbk(α)) = pbk(ǫ) fake(pvk(α)) = pvk(ǫ)
fake(shk(α, α)) = shk(ǫ, ǫ) fake(f(τ1, τ2)) = f(fake(τ1), fake(τ2))
⇒ ξ ∪ θ is well-typed.
Thus the interleaving of C0 and ξ∪θ describe an attack of the protocol, and since ξ∪θ,
they describe a well-typed attack. We can therefore conclude that if Π admits an attack,
then Π admits a well-typed attack. ⊓⊔
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C A valid trace for the Needham-Schroeder protocol
(SId0, q0, I0)
(SId1, q1, I1)
SId1 = {σ1}
q1(σ1) = (1, a, ǫ, ∅, 1)
I1 = I0
(SId2, q2, I2)
SId2 = {σ1}
q2(σ1) = (1, a, ǫ, ∅, 2)
I2 = I1 ∪ {{a,N
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ)}pbk(ǫ)}
new (σ1, 1, a, ǫ) send (σ1, 1)
(SId3, q3, I3)
SId3 = {σ1, σ2}
q3(σ1) = q2(σ1)
q3(σ2) = (2, a, b, ∅, 1)
I3 = I2
new(σ2, 2, a, b) receive(σ2, 1, {a,N11 (σ1, a, ǫ)}pbk(b))
(SId4, q4, I4)
SId4 = {σ1, σ2}
q4(σ1) = q3(σ1)
q4(σ2) = (2, a, b, [X
2
1 (σ2, a, b) ← N
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ)], 2)
I4 = I3
(SId5, q5, I5)
SId5 = {σ1, σ2}
q5(σ1) = q4(σ1)
q5(σ2) = (2, a, b, [X
2
1 (σ2, a, b) ← N
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ))], 3)
I5 = I4 ∪ {{N
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ), N
2
1 (σ2, a, b)}pbk(a)}
send(σ2, 2)
receive(σ1, 2, {N11 (σ1, a, ǫ), N21 (σ2, a, b)}pbk(a))
(SId6, q6, I6)
SId6 = {σ1, σ2}
q6(σ1) = (1, a, ǫ, [X
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ) ← N
2
1 (σ2, a, b)], 3)
q6(σ2) = q5(σ2)
I6 = I5
send(σ1, 3)
(SId7, q7, I7)
SId7 = {σ1, σ2}
q7(σ1) = (1, a, ǫ, [X
1
1 (σ1, a, ǫ) ← N
2
1 (σ2, a, b)], 4)
q7(σ2) = q6(σ2)
I7 = I6 ∪ {{N
2
1 (σ2, a, b)}pbk(ǫ)}
Fig. 4. A valid trace of ΠNS
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